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The primary goal of this paper is to investigate whether an ontology of thisness is 
forthcoming.  Given some individual x, a thisness is the property of being x, or the property 
of being identical to x.  Thisnesses—as I will be conceiving of them—are also primitive and 
purely non-qualitative properties; in other words, they are not instantiated by individuals 
derivatively or in virtue of standing in relations to other individuals, nor are they merely 
conjunctions of qualitative properties (see Adams 1979).  In an earlier paper, I defended the 
existence of such properties—at least for a limited class of individuals (see Diekemper 2009); 
but here I am interested in investigating what it is for an individual x to instantiate or 
exemplify its thisness.  Although there has been a great deal of discussion in the literature 
both as to whether such properties exist, as well as to the use to which they can be put 
assuming that they do exist, there has been very little, if any, discussion about the ontological 
relationship between a thisness and the individual that instantiates it.
1
   
 Perhaps there is good reason for this lack of an ontology of thisness.  Why, after all, 
should we suppose that thisnesses require their own ontology, distinct from that of qualitative 
                                                          
1
 I think this is a fair assessment.  The most in depth contemporary discussion of the nature of thisness of 
which I am aware is Rosenkrantz (1993); but Rosenkrantz does not have much to say about the relationship 
between a thisness and its individual.   
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properties?  I offer two reasons for such a supposition now, though more reasons will arise in 
the course of the investigation.  First, there is already a precedence for adopting distinct 
ontologies for thisnesses and for qualitative properties.  Adams (1981) argues that although 
qualitative properties are to be conceived of on the Platonic model, i.e. as necessarily 
existing, thisnesses cannot be so conceived.  His reasons for adopting this ‘bifurcated 
realism’2 have to do with considerations from modal actualism and its alleged incompatibility 
with necessarily existing thisnesses.  I do not have the space to treat these arguments here, but 
I want simply to register that although I am (to my knowledge) the first contemporary 
philosopher to pursue an ontology of thisness in its own right, I am not the first to see the 
need for a distinction in one’s ontology between qualitative properties and thisnesses 
(although, for reasons that I discuss below, I reject Adams’ bifurcated realism).   
Another reason for thinking that thisnesses require their own ontology is that they 
resist categorization under other common property kinds: they are like universals in that they 
seem to be abstract, and they are like essences in that they are essential to their bearers, but 
since they are also necessarily unique to their bearers, they are not universal!  In their 
uniqueness, they are like tropes (conceived of as individual accidents), except that they are 
not accidental.   So thisnesses are neither universals, nor mere essences, nor individual 
accidents; rather, they are individual essences; and, as such, it is not clear which category 
they fall under or how one ought to conceive of their ontology.  I will say something more 
about the ontological distinction between universals and thisnesses in Section 2.2. 
Although my primary goal here is to pursue an ontology for thisness, the methodology 
I will be employing in that pursuit will yield an important secondary goal as well.  This is 
because  my  methodology will be to canvass three different, broadly Aristotelian, ontologies 
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 This is how Rosenkrantz (op.cit.) refers to Adams’s realism. 
3 
 
which might serve as models for an ontology of thisness.  Given the differences between 
thisnesses and qualitative properties which I have just outlined, the models, of course, can 
only provide loose frameworks for a possible ontology of thisness.  So I will need to consider 
the virtues of the models both as ontologies in their own right, and as models for an ontology 
of thisness.  It may be that one model is best suited for thisness, and another best suited for 
the purposes it is meant fulfil, but I assume it is a desideratum of an ontology of thisness that 
it be structurally similar to that of qualitative properties, to the extent that their unique nature 
allows this.  As I have just noted, this is where Adams’s ontology of thisness bifurcates with 
his ontology of qualitative properties, since he thinks the latter are Platonic, necessarily 
existing entities, and he rejects this conception for thisnesses.  For my part, I find Adams’ 
arguments against Platonic thisnesses convincing, but given the desideratum above, and 
given independent reasons for preferring an Aristotelian conception of qualitative properties, 




Finally, I assume that at least some category/ies of entities have thisness, and I will be 
looking for a general account of how any entity or individual might instantiate thisness; but 
the models I will consider will focus specifically on material substances and their properties.  
This is because material substances are the most familiar—and are often taken to be the most 
                                                          
3
 Adams argues against necessarily existing thisnesses in Adams (1981, 1986); and Plantinga argues for 
necessarily existing thisnesses in Plantinga (1976, 1983).  For fairly recent discussions of the debate, see 
Williamson (2002), David (2009), and Merricks (2011).  All parties to this debate seem to assume that 
qualitative properties, at least, are Platonic; and no one offers an explanation of how a thisness conceived on 
the Aristotelian model might be related to its individual.  In contrast, I will attempt to answer the latter 
question by assuming that qualitative properties are Aristotelian, and then by modelling thisness on such an 
ontology.   
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fundamental—items of ontology, and so it makes sense to start the search for an ontological 
model for thisness by canvassing different substance ontologies.  I will proceed first in 
Sections 1 and 2 by considering two different Aristotelian ontologies (the first due to Loux 
and the second to Lowe) as models; in Section 3, I will consider a hybrid Aristotelian 
ontology which combines aspects of both Loux’s and Lowe’s models; and finally in Section 4 
I will arrive at some conclusions about the most apt ontology for thisness, as well as address 
the issue of how other kinds of entities (in particular events) might instantiate thisness.   
1.0 Loux’s Aristotelian constituent ontology 
1.1 The Ontology 
The first ontology I will consider is that according to Loux (2006), and it is based on 
Aristotle’s account of substance in the Metaphysics.  Loux argues that on this Aristotelian 
ontology, we should think of substances as being composed of more basic constituents, and, 
at least in the case of material substances, as composites of form (conceived of as Aristotle’s 
‘primary substances’, or what I will refer to as ‘substantial universals’) and matter.  
Substances are instantiations of substantial universals by extended matter, and as such have 
internal structure.
4
  So a given substance, say, Rocky the cat, is a metaphysical composite of 
the matter of which Rocky is composed plus the substantial universal catness.  On this view, 
substances do not instantiate substantial forms, since it is not the cat that instantiates catness; 
rather, it is the cat’s matter that instantiates catness.  Furthermore, since catness is a 
constituent of all cat substances, it is the constituent matter of each individual cat that serves 
to individuate them.  According to Loux’s rendering of Aristotle, this matter may, in turn, be 
                                                          
4
 Loux, following Aristotle, expresses the relationship between a universal and its bearer in terms of 
predication.  According to Loux, Aristotle conceives of predication as a metaphysical relation between non-
linguistic objects, and not merely a semantic relation.  I will continue to use the terminology of  instantiation, 
though at times I will also speak of predication.   
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the instantiation of a form by lower level matter.  This process of matter being composed of 
more basic matter will eventually cease when we arrive at an original matter, i.e. ‘a matter 
that has nothing else for its matter’ (Loux, op.cit.: 230).  For Aristotle, this may have 
consisted in the four elements (earth, air, fire, water), or some ‘prime matter’ which these 
four elements have in common.  Presumably, however, this aspect of the theory could be 
updated by taking the microphysical constituents of matter to be ultimately basic.  Whatever 
we determine as playing the role of original matter, since there is no more basic matter by 
reference to which the matter in question can be individuated, the individuating at this level 
must be done by spatiotemporal location (see ibid.: 232). 
 If substances are instantiations of substantial universals by matter, then what is the 
relationship between substances and their accidental universals?  According to Loux, 
Aristotle holds that it is the substance itself which instantiates its accidental universals, and 
this results in a distinct ontological category which Aristotle calls a coincidental.  So, for 
example, the cat, qua substance, is a composite of matter and catness; but the ginger cat, qua 
coincidental, is a composite of the cat qua substance and gingerness.  Of course, Aristotle 
would acknowledge that the ‘cat’ and the ‘ginger cat’ refer to the same animal, but would 
simply claim that, qua substance and qua coincidental, the cat and the ginger cat 
(respectively) are distinct ontological entities.  Loux explains that Aristotle recognizes two 
kinds of unity here: accidental unity and unity in being, where the latter is what we would call 
numerical identity.  The composite that is the ginger cat is essentially (and trivially) ginger, 
but of course the cat is not essentially ginger—it might have been brown—therefore the unity 
that holds between the ginger cat and the cat is merely an accidental unity.  This is to be 
contrasted with the unity that holds between the cat and itself (or between the ginger cat and 
itself), which is a unity in being (i.e. numerical identity).   
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 Perhaps surprisingly—given its Aristotelian pedigree—on this account substantial 
universals are not instantiated essentially by their bearers, since the bearers are portions of 
matter, and any given portion of matter could have been informed by a different organizing 
principle (i.e. could have instantiated a different substantial universal).  How, then, is the 
essential predication of kinds accommodated on this account?
5
  According to Loux, it is the 
relevant species universal which is essentially instantiated by a given substance.  This 
instantiation is derivative to that of substantial universals and accidental universals, even 
though these are contingent.  So the instantiation of substantial universals by matter and the 
instantiation of accidental universals by substances are both cases of primitive yet contingent 
instantiation; whereas the instantiation of species universals by substances is derivative but 
essential (see Fig. 1).   
 The advantage of this conception of universals and substances over the Platonic 
conception, according to which substances somehow ‘participate in’ or ‘resemble’ the 
universals which they exemplify, is that it makes it completely perspicuous what a substance 
is, and the role that universals play in the ontology of substances.   This, indeed, is the 
advantage of any constituent ontology over what Loux, borrowing from Wolterstorff, calls a 
relational ontology: the relational ontology (of which the Platonic conception is one version) 
leaves it somewhat of a mystery as to what exactly is being related (i.e. substance and 
universal), and as to how they are related.  One likely objection that the relational ontologist 
would make to this claim is to accuse the constituent ontologist of reducing substances to 
their constituents, and thereby deleting from the list of categories what is pre-theoretically the 
most fundamental item of ontology.  The relational ontologist will acknowledge that there is 
not a lot that can be said about a substance and how it is related to the universals it 
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instantiates, but she will claim that this is to be expected if we conceive of substances as 
primitive and fundamental.  But notice that the Aristotelian model I have sketched here is, as 
far as contemporary constituent ontologies go, minimally reductionist.  It is only reductive in 
a very weak sense, since the reduction of substance to a composite of matter and substantial 
universal does not involve the reduction of its kind determining universal to more basic 
universals.  According to Loux, this means that all and only the members of a particular 
substance kind K have as a constituent a universal which determines that they are members of 
K, and this universal cannot, qua constituent of a member of K, be reduced or analyzed (ibid: 
242). 
 Such a  minimally reductive approach is to be contrasted with other constituent 
ontologies, which either reduce a substance’s properties to its microphysical ones (such as in 
contemporary versions of the bare substratum theory) or claim that the only properties 
substances instantiate are the purely phenomenal ones (such as in bundle theories).  Of 
course, as I mentioned above, there is the scope for reducing the matter that serves as one 
constituent of a substance to more basic matter, or to the microphysical constituents of 
matter, but this is not a reduction of substance, nor a reduction of substantial universals.  So a 
substance is a composite of a plurality of constituents, but one of these constituents is 
metaphysically prior to the others and determines what the substance is (by being instantiated 
by the portion of matter which jointly constitutes the substance), and this kind determining 
universal is basic and unanalyzable.  This picture provides a welcome balance between the 
relational ontology on the one hand, which fails to fully explain substances and the role of 
universals in an ontology of substance, and other constituent ontologies on the other hand, 




 Before considering how this ontology might be employed as a model for thisness, I 
first want to consider an objection to the ontology—or rather, a cluster of objections which all 
have to do with the concept of immanence.  One common objection to  a substance ontology 
which includes Aristotelian universals is to wonder how a general feature—one that is shared 
and yet not divided—can be a constituent of a substance.  On the present view, universals are 
immanent in the things that instantiate them, rather than existing outside space and time.  
Indeed, this aspect of Aristotelian universals is often cited as a virtue, since it avoids the 
mysteriousness of Platonic universals, which exist outside space and time, and which are 
thought by some to be explanatorily deficient on that account.
6
  However, inasmuch as 
universals are abstract objects, it cannot be the case that they are divided up in their instances, 
such that matter and substances only instantiate a part of the universals of which they are 
instances.
7
  So we must say that universals, on this view, are wholly located in each of their 
instances; and yet one and the same universal can have indefinitely many instances at any 
point in time.  As Lowe points out in his critique of this conception of universals, we seem to 
lose our grip on the concept of spatiotemporal location when we claim that one thing is 
wholly located in numerous places at the same time.
8
  There are no other entities, according 
to Lowe, about which we would allow a similar claim, so why should we allow that 
universals are any different?  To answer this question by simply asserting that universals are 
different fails to illuminate the problem.  We want to know how any kind of entity can have 
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 See, for example, Lowe (2006: 98). 
7
 See Hoffman, J. and Rosenkrantz, G., (2003: 54). 
8
 See Lowe (2006: 98-99).  For my part, I take Lowe’s objections to count against phenomenal properties only, 
and not against substantial universals, which are formal organizing principles (see below). 
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maximal, multiple, but discontinuous spatial locations at the same time.  Absent such an 
explanation, Loux’s constituent ontology is reduced in its explanatory power. 
 Perhaps, however, this gets the ontology wrong.  Perhaps we should not gloss 
immanence as a claim about universals themselves, but as a claim about their instances.  So, 
although universals have instances in space and time, they are not themselves in space and 
time.  Unfortunately this will not get us very far, since it is not clear how this account of 
‘immanence’ is able to avoid the transcendence of Platonic universals.  As a matter of fact, 
Lowe (2006: 98-99) argues that the concept of immanence, as employed in this context, is 
either incoherent (for reasons given in the previous paragraph) or amounts simply to the 
instantiation of particularized properties.  If properties really are immanent and wholly 
located in their instances, then they must be particulars, since only particulars can have a 
particular location in space and time.  Lowe therefore endorses an ontology according to 
which a substance’s accidental properties are particular instances of accidental universals.   
We will consider this ontology in Section 2; but I want to flag the relevance of the 
distinction between substantial universals and accidental universals in this context.  
Substantial universals are formal principles of organization which inform the matter in which 
they are instantiated, whereas accidental universals are phenomenal properties of substances.  
The relevance of this distinction in the current context is this: the objections from immanence 
are more pressing for accidental universals than they are for substantial universals.  To see 
why this is the case, consider that phenomenal properties can be demonstrably referred to 
while organizing principles cannot.  I can point to the blue in my shirt and say, ‘Look at the 
blueness of my shirt.’ I cannot, however, point to Rocky’s catness and say, ‘Look at Rocky’s 
catness.’  I can indirectly refer to Rocky’s catness by demonstrably referring to those 
accidental universals of his which characterize his catness; but, as we have seen, catness is 
not reducible to these.  Given these considerations, it is more difficult to conceive of a 
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phenomenal property, such as blueness, being wholly present in multiple locations at the 
same time, than it is to conceive of a formal organizing principle such as catness informing 
distinct portions of matter at the same time.  In the latter case, we feel very little conceptual 
pressure to question how the very same principle could wholly inform distinct portions of 
matter, since a principle is a paradigm case of an abstractum.  Of course, blueness here is 
supposed to be an abstract object as well, but the problem is that it does not appear that it can 
be when it is immanent in a substance.  So, given our concept of spatiotemporal location, we 
do feel conceptual pressure to question how the very same blueness can be wholly present in 
two distinct substances.  I take it, then, that the objections from immanence are meant to 
count against accidental, not substantial, universals.  That, at any rate, is how I intend them. 
1.2 Loux’s ontology as a model for thisness 
Having considered Loux’s ontology on its own terms, we now need to evaluate it as a model 
for thisness.  We should note at the outset, however, a feature of Loux’s ontology that may 
bear on any conclusions we might make regarding thisness.  Given the individuating role that 
matter plays in the ontology, and given that, on this ontology, matter instantiates substantial 
universals in a primitive, irreducible way, we may find that the model renders the positing of 
thisness redundant.  We will return to this point at the end of this section.  
In trying to adapt Loux’s ontology for an ontology of thisness, we need to consider 
where among the different categories of properties in the model we should situate thisness.  
Our three choices are i) substantial universals; ii) accidental universals; and iii) species 
universals (see Fig. 1).  Once again, thisnesses do not strictly align with any of these 
categories, but we should evaluate which of the three aligns most closely with thisness, and 
then make necessary adaptations to the model to accommodate thisness.  With respect to i), 
substantial universals are organizing principles which inform the matter that instantiates 
them.  They are instantiated primitively, yet contingently, and they are constituents of, or 
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ingredients in, their substances.  Thisnesses are also instantiated primitively, but they are 
individuating—not organizing—principles, and they are not constituents: they are instantiated 
not by matter but by substances themselves.  If we did claim that they were instantiated by 
matter in order to accommodate this model, we would have to claim that, e.g., Rocky the 
cat’s matter had the property of being identical to Rocky.  But that is a property that belongs 
to Rocky, and not to his matter.  Furthermore, thisnesses are essential properties, and, on the 
current model, substantial universals are not essential, since they are predicated of matter, not 
of substances.  So there are several respects—some quite drastic—in which we would have to 
deviate from the ontology in order to model thisnesses on i).   
 With respect to ii), accidental universals are also primitively instantiated, but they are 
predicated of substances rather than matter, so on that score they fair better than i).  However, 
just as with i), they are not essential to their bearers (they are accidental!).  This strikes me as 
a rather benign disanalogy though, since there is nothing about their place in the ontological 
framework which requires that they be contingently instantiated; it is, rather, a consequence 
of the nature of material substances (i.e. that they can undergo qualitative change without 
undergoing substantial change).  So there is scope here to slot thisnesses into the ontological 
position held by accidental universals, with the caveat that the former, unlike the latter, are 
essential properties.  In this case we would also have to remove the part of the framework 
involving the composition of coincidentals by accidental universals and substances, since it’s 
not clear that substances and their thisnesses together compose some distinct entity (see Fig. 
2).   
 Moving on to species properties, they are both essential and predicated of substances.  
These universals, however, are instantiated by substances in virtue of the substance being a 
composite of matter and the species determining substantial universal.  This is what Loux, 
following Aristotle, means by saying that the species universal is instantiated derivatively but 
12 
 
essentially: given that a particular portion of matter contingently instantiates its substantial 
universal, the resulting substance is essentially a member of the species which corresponds to 
that substantial universal.  So the substance could not exist and fail to be a member of its 
species, but this is only because the substance’s matter instantiates the relevant substantial 
universal, and when it (i.e. the matter) ceases to instantiate that universal, then the substance 
ceases to instantiate the species universal: that is to say, the substance ceases to exist.  This is 
a case of what Aristotle calls substantial change, and on the current account, substantial 
change is fundamentally a case of the matter of a substance beginning or ceasing to 
instantiate a substantial universal, and it is only derivatively a case of the substance beginning 
or ceasing to instantiate its species universal.  So how does all this bear upon the question of 
whether or not the role played by species universals in Loux’s ontology is a suitable one on 
which to model thisness?  The limitation of that role vis-à-vis thisness is that a substance 
instantiates its species universal derivatively, and as we have seen, thisnesses are instantiated 
primitively.  As with i), I think the adjustment required to model thisness after the role played 
by species universals in Loux’s ontology would be too drastic.  This is because the derivative 
nature of species universals is a consequence of their place in the ontological framework, and 
as such it would not be plausible to suggest that properties modelled after species universals 
were instantiated primitively. 
 It appears, then, that in determining which aspect of Loux’s ontology we might model 
thisness on, accidental universals best fit the bill, given that the adjustments attending that 
suggestion depart least from the original ontology (see Fig. 2).  There remain, however, some 
issues with this suggestion.  Earlier I claimed that one of the advantages of an Aristotelian 
ontology over the Platonic ontology was that the former offers a more powerful explanation 
of the relation between a substance and its properties: properties are immanent in their 
substances, as opposed to being transcendent to them.  In addition, I would claim that 
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immanence is a characteristic to be desired in thisnesses, since, arguably, it better accounts 
for their individuating role.  Thisnesses are supposed to capture the particularity of the 
individuals that have them, but if thisness is not immanent in an individual, how can it do the 
work it’s supposed to do, i.e.,  individuate this particular individual?  If thisnesses are 
transcendent to the individuals that have them, then it seems that we have particularity on the 
cheap.  Of course, this is not a relevant concern if we are only interested in properties as 
universals, because then particularity is not an issue (universals are general or common 
features), but thisnesses are not general features, they are essentially and uniquely a feature of 
an individual x, and it is far more plausible that such a feature be immanent in x rather than 
transcendent to x.  Now, in the case of Loux’s ontology, immanence is captured in terms of 
constitution: substantial universals are constituents of substances, and accidental universals 
are constituents of coincidentals.
9
  Given, however, that thisnesses cannot plausibly be 
conceived of as constituents of substances (since this would require that they be predicated of 
matter, and Rocky’s matter does not have the property of being identical to Rocky), nor as 
constituents of coincidentals (since there is nothing coincidental about a substance’s 
instantiating its thisness), on the present model they are not constituents of anything.  This, 
once again, allows a certain degree of mysteriousness to pervade the account, since it leaves 
us wondering what it is for a thisness to be immanent in a substance.   
 There is a further, related complication in modelling thisness after Loux’s ontology.  
We want thisnesses to be immanent in the individuals that instantiate them, in order to 
capture their individuality; but we may also want to say that thisnesses—though ontologically 
dependent on their individuals’ coming into existence—continue to exist even after the 
demise of their individuals.  Call the claim that the thisnesses of future individuals do not 
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 Though, as we saw above (Section 1.1), this account of immanence still does not address the problem of how 
one accidental universal can be a constituent of many different particulars at the same time. 
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exist, but the thisnesses of past individuals do exist, the Time and Thisness Thesis (TTT).  
Adams (1986) argues for TTT, and I defend and elaborate on the thesis in Diekemper 
(manuscript).  Suffice it for our purposes here to note that if one endorses an objective, 
ontological asymmetry between the past and future (as I do), then TTT is a highly attractive 
thesis.
10
   
Now, given the immanence of Aristotelian universals and their ontological 
dependence upon their instances, it is standard to adopt a principle of instantiation for such 
universals which reflects one’s preferred theory of time.  So, for example, Armstrong (1999: 
198), who has an Aristotelian theory of universals and an eternalist theory of time, endorses 
what he characterizes as a ‘relatively liberal form’ of the principle, according to which it 
ranges over all times.  Thus, according to Armstrong, every universal must be instantiated at 
some time, but not necessarily at the present time.  Loux, on the other hand, following after 
Aristotle (whom he takes to be a presentist), endorses a tensed principle of instantiation 
according to which every universal must be instantiated at the present time.  If, however, we 
are using Loux’s ontology as a model for thisness, and we endorse TTT, then our principle of 
instantiation for thisness will assert that all thisnesses must either be presently instantiated, or 
have been instantiated in the past.  And now the complication becomes evident, since it is not 
clear how that principle of instantiation is possible, inasmuch as it is not clear how a thisness 
which is immanent in an individual can survive that individual’s demise.  This, however, is 
only a complication for those who feel compelled to endorse TTT. 
Finally, what of the issue of redundancy, which I raised at the beginning of this sub-
section?  I refer the reader again to Fig. 2, in which I have modeled thisness on the accidental 
universals of Loux’s ontology (with some adjustments).  Consider that matter is still an 
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 I defend such an ontological asymmetry in Diekemper (2005).  
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essential part of this model, and that it features at a more fundamental level in the model than 
does thisness.  It appears, then, that thisness is not bringing anything additional to the model 
that is not already provided by the constituent account of substantial particulars.  I say 
‘appears,’ because ultimately that claim depends upon whether one thinks that matter can 
individuate, and, in particular, whether matter can individuate across possible worlds.  We 
will return to this issue in Section 3, but for the moment I will simply record the thought that 
if matter can, indeed, individuate across possible worlds, and if one wished to endorse Loux’s 
Aristotelian constituent ontology, then it would be superfluous to also endorse thisness, at 
least in the case of material substances. 
2.0  Lowe’s Aristotelian four-category ontology 
2.1 The Ontology 
We now turn to Lowe’s (2006) ‘four-category’ ontology, which he derives from Aristotle’s 
Categories.
11
  According to this ontology, substances just are instantiations of substantial 
universals.  Matter does not play an essential role in this ontology, and substances on this 
view are not to be conceived of as composite entities which can be further analyzed in terms 
of their constituents.  As for accidental universals, Lowe also acknowledges these, but denies 
that they are instantiated by substances; rather, substances are ‘characterized’ by 
particularized properties (i.e. tropes, or what Lowe calls ‘modes’), which in turn are 
instantiations of accidental universals.
12
  Lowe takes these modes to be the ‘individual 
accidents’ or ‘nonsubstantial individuals’ of Aristotle’s Categories. 13  Although Lowe 
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 See Lowe (2006: Chs. 6-7) and Lowe (2000). 
12
 Lowe variously refers to accidental universals as ‘attributes,’ ‘properties’ and ‘non-substantial universals,’ 
but for the sake of consistency with Section 1, I will continue to refer to these as accidental universals. 
13
 Lowe is not alone in taking these items to be particularized, nonrecurrent properties, see also Mulligan (et 
al) (1984) and Wedin (2000: Ch. 2). 
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intends for his modes (Lowe credits Locke with the term) to be co-extensive with what most 
contemporary philosophers would call ‘tropes,’ he avoids the latter term in view of its 
association with nominalism and  the trope bundle theory, for Lowe’s ontology is a 
thoroughly realist one.  Furthermore, he rejects the trope bundle theorist’s characterization of 
particularized properties as constituents of material objects.  Modes, rather, are individual 
instantiations of accidental universals which characterize a substance and which ontologically 
depend upon that substance.   
 Lowe refers to the ontological dependence of a mode upon its substance as rigid, in 
order to capture the idea that, necessarily, the existence of the substance is a necessary 
condition for the existence of the mode (see Lowe, op.cit.: 34-6 and 116-17).  Accidental 
universals, in turn, ontologically depend upon their individual instantiations (their modes), 
but they do so only non-rigidly.  This is because it is not necessarily the case that the 
existence of any particular mode is a necessary condition for the existence of its accidental 
universal.  An accidental universal exists only if there is at least one instance of it, and there 
may be many instances of the accidental universal in question.  However, in the possible 
world in which a given mode is the only instance of its accidental universal, then, in that 
world, the existence of the mode is a necessary condition for the existence of the universal 
(thus the non-rigidity of the dependence).  So for Lowe, accidental universals are general 
‘ways things are’, whereas modes are particular ‘ways things are.’  Substantial universals, on 
the other hand, are ‘what things are.’ 
 Thus Lowe’s ontology posits four fundamental, interrelated categories: substances (or 
‘substantial particulars’), substantial universals, modes and accidental universals (see Fig. 3).  
These categories stand in various formal relationships with one another: substances and 
modes instantiate (respectively) substantial universals and accidental universals; accidental 
universals and modes characterize (respectively) substantial universals and substances; and 
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substances exemplify accidental universals.  The relationship of exemplification is a 
derivative one which holds in virtue of two different basic relationships: i) a substance 
exemplifies an accidental universal in virtue of being characterized by a particular 
instantiation of that universal (i.e. a mode); and ii) a substance exemplifies the accidental 
universal in virtue of being an instantiation of a substantial universal which is characterized 
by the accidental universal.  So a violet exemplifies blueness both in virtue of being 
characterized by its particular blueness, which, in turn, is an instance of the universal 
blueness; and also in virtue of being an instance of the violet kind, which in turn is 
characterized by the universal blueness. 
 Why does Lowe think that both accidental universals and modes are required for an 
adequate ontology?  Recall Lowe’s criticism of immanent realism in Section 1.1, above (an 
objection which I took to count against Loux’s accidental—not substantial—universals).  As 
we saw there, Lowe thinks that the notion of immanence is highly problematic, since it is 
either conceptually incoherent (in that it allows the inexplicable violation of our concept of 
spatiotemporal location), or it amounts to nothing more than the positing of particularized 
properties.  Since Lowe agrees with the constituent ontologist that the Platonic notion of 
transcendent and necessarily existing universals should be jettisoned, he thinks that the only 
coherent way to allow for this is by positing both universals and modes.  Only by doing so 
can we coherently and adequately explain the causal and perceptual relevance of universals.  
Thus it is the particular instantiations of accidental universals which are causally relevant and 
which account for our knowledge of the qualities of substances.  On this model, when I see 
the blueness of a violet, I am not seeing an abstract universal, I am seeing a particular, 
concrete instantiation of an abstract universal: i.e., the particular blueness of this particular 
flower.    
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 With respect to the nature of substances, Lowe thinks that he has accommodated both 
the Aristotle of the Categories—by claiming that individual concrete things are the primary 
substances—and the Aristotle of the Metaphysics—by allowing that particular substantial 
forms (or universals) are the primary substances; this is because he thinks individual concrete 
things just are instances of substantial forms (Lowe 1998: 209).  So individual concrete 
things serve what are normally thought to be distinct ontological roles: they are both 
instantiations of universals, and that in which the universal is instantiated.
14
  This approach 
certainly does justice to the idea that substances are fundamental to ontology, and therefore 
that a substance ontology should treat them as primitive and irreducible.  If, however, one 
thought it a desideratum of a substance ontology that it be able to provide an account of what 
the relationship between a substance and its substantial universal amounts to, then one might 
find Lowe’s substance ontology unsatisfying; for, according to Lowe, there is nothing more 
to say than that a substance just is an instantiation of a substantial universal.  But one is left 
wondering what it is for a substance to be such a thing, and to instantiate such a universal.  
Lowe, of course, thinks that this is what a non-reductive account amounts to, and to analyze 
substances further would force an unacceptable reduction of substances.  But as we saw in 
Section 1, if one desired a more thoroughgoing analysis of what a substance is, with only 
very minimal and ontologically benign reductive ramifications, then Loux’s constituent 
ontology seems to fit the bill. 
2.2 Lowe’s ontology as a model for thisness 
                                                          
14
 I say ‘normally thought’ because one need not conceive of substantial universals and substantial particulars 
as two different ontological categories.  One might, instead, think of these as two different ways of looking at 
individual concrete things (I thank Anna Marmodoro for this point).  Lowe, however, does conceive of them as 
distinct categories (thus the ‘four category ontology’). 
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So although Lowe’s ontology solves the immanence problem faced by Loux’s model, in so 
doing it stops short of a complete analysis of what a substance is.  It does, however, provide a 
promising model for thisness (again, with some modification), inasmuch as it postulates a 
two step model of how substances ‘exemplify’ accidental universals.  Again, they do so in 
virtue of being characterized by modes which, in turn, are instantiations of accidental 
universals.
15
  This two step model of exemplification is a promising one for thisness because 
it has the resources to capture the idea that thisnesses are individual essences.  Recall from 
the introduction that thisnesses resist categorization because they are like tropes (or Lowe’s 
modes) in their individuality, but inasmuch as they are essences they are like abstract 
properties; so they are a sort of cross breed between universals and tropes (or modes).  Now, 
in view of Lowe’s two step exemplification ontology, we can claim that there are both 
thisness properties and thisness modes, thus accounting for both aspects.  Thus, for a given a 
substance x, we have the abstract thisness property being identical to x, and the thisness 
mode, which is the particular instantiation of being identical to x.   
 Adapting Lowe’s ontology for these purposes requires the following modifications.  
First, since Lowe’s ontology has it that only accidental universals participate in this two step 
exemplification process, and not substantial universals (for the obvious reason that substantial 
universals are not individual), we must consider thisnesses on the model of accidental 
properties.  Just as in the case Loux’s ontology, however, this is a benign substitution, since 
there is nothing in Lowe’s ontological framework which entails that essential properties 
cannot participate in the two step exemplification process.  Second, since substantial 
                                                          
15
 Of course, as we saw in section 2.1 above, according to Lowe, a substance also exemplifies an accidental 
universal in virtue of being an instantiation of a substantial universal which is characterized by the accidental 
universal.  For reasons that will become clear, however, this cashing out of the exemplification relationship is 
not as relevant in the context of providing a model for thisness. 
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universals play no role in the thisness model (remember, substantial universals are 
qualitative, whereas thisnesses are not), they fall out of the model.  Finally, we do not want to 
claim that the thisness modes characterize substances (as in the original ontology), since, 
again, this is what qualitative properties do; rather, we should replace this relationship 
between a substance and its thisness mode with one of individuation: a thisness mode 
individuates its substance.  So according to the model, a substance exemplifies its thisness 
property in virtue of being individuated by its thisness mode, which in turn is an instantiation 
the thisness property (see Fig.4).   
 Notice that this model is able to deal with the two issues faced by the previous model 
derived from Loux’s ontology (see section 1.2).  Those two issues were i) that the model was 
unable to give an account of the immanence of thisness, and therefore that it could not 
capture the particularity of thisness; and ii) that the model was unable to allow for the 
possibility that thisnesses might survive the demise of their individuals (as in Adams’s TTT).  
On the present model, however, the particularity of thisness is captured by the particular 
instantiation of a thisness property by a thisness mode.  The latter thus individuates a 
substance by being immanent in it.  What is it for a thisness mode to be immanent in its 
substance?  It cannot be on the model of a qualitative mode’s immanence in its substance 
since, as we saw, that immanence accounts for our perception of qualities in substances, and 
thisness modes cannot be perceived as qualitative modes can.  But if we think of an 
individual x’s thisness property F as a formal principle of individuation for x, and x’s thisness 
mode F* as the (unique) particular instantiation of that principle, then F* is the individuating 
principle of this particular individual x.  The thought is that for the principle to do the 
individuating work it does in some particular spatiotemporal entity, it must have the same 
spatiotemporal status, at least as long as the entity exists.  Furthermore, although the thisness 
mode is in its substance, in keeping with Lowe’s conception of a mode, the thisness mode is 
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not a constituent of the substance, since a composite entity is ontologically dependent upon 
its constituents.  The thisness mode, conversely, is rigidly ontologically dependent upon its 
substance (i.e., necessarily, the thisness mode exists only if the substance exists).   
 The thisness property, in turn, ontologically depends upon the thisness mode—but in 
this case (as in Lowe’s original model), the ontological dependence is non-rigid.  Recall that 
in the case of the ontological dependence of accidental universals on modes, the non-rigidity 
of that formal relationship was meant to capture the idea that accidental universals only 
depend upon a single instance for their existence, not on all such instances.  In the case of 
thisness properties, however, they necessarily have one and only one mode, so why maintain 
that this ontological dependence is non-rigid rather than rigid?  The reason is to  allow the 
theory to cope with issue ii), specified above.  If our model of thisness is to make sense of 
Adams’s TTT, then it needs to allow for the existence of thisnesses of past individuals.  The 
thisness mode is a particular property which rigidly ontologically depends upon its substance, 
so when the substance ceases to exist, so does the thisness mode.  The thisness property, 
however, is an abstract—not a particularized—property, so it will continue to exist even after 
the thisness mode upon which it ontologically depends ceases to exist.  Thus we have to 
specify an ontological dependence whereby the existence of a thisness property F depends 
upon its thisness mode F* having come into existence, but not necessarily existing now.  I 
take it that this is also a kind of non-rigid ontological dependence, but where the non-rigidity 
is temporal rather than modal: that is, there is some time at which F ontologically depends 
upon F*’s existence, but it does not do so at all times (just as in Lowe’s modal, non-rigid 
ontological dependence, there is some possible world at which an accidental property 
ontologically depends upon a particular one of its modes, but it does not do so in all possible 
worlds).     
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 According to this ontological framework, when a substance x begins to exist at a time 
t, both its thisness mode F* (which individuates it) and its thisness property F (of which F* is 
an instance) also begin to exist.  Upon x’s demise, F* also ceases to exist, but F continues to 
exist.  I take this model to be a promising one which we will return to in Section 4.  Before 
moving on, however, I want to note an implication of conceiving of thisnesses as formal 
individuating principles.  Doing so bolsters the motivation for providing a distinct ontology 
of thisness.  This is because, on such a conception, thisnesses cannot be subsumed under the 
same category as either accidental or substantial universals.  As we have seen, the former are 
phenomenal and susceptible to demonstrative reference, whereas thisnesses, like substantial 
universals, are formal principles and therefore not so susceptible. Substantial universals, 
however, are organizing principles, whereas thisnesses are individuating principles, and they 
therefore play a distinct ontological role to that of substantial universals.  Thus the need for a 
distinct ontology for thisness. 
3.0 A hybrid Aristotelian ontology 
In this section I want to consider one final substance ontology—both on its own, and as a 
model for thisness.  The ontology I will present here is one that is not currently represented in 
the literature; it is, in fact, a hybrid Aristotelian ontology which combines aspects of both 
Loux’s and Lowe’s ontologies.  Given that we have already covered its predecessors in depth, 
it will not take long to present the ontology and discuss its suitability as a model for thisness.   
3.1 The ontology 
My reason for desiring to pursue a hybrid ontology is to attempt to avoid the objections I 
raised to its predecessors.  To recapitulate those objections: Loux’s ontology was unable to 
offer a coherent account of immanence, and Lowe’s ontology did not provide a 
thoroughgoing analysis of substance (even though, as we have just seen, Lowe’s ontology did 
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provide a good model for an ontology of thisness).
16
  In order to dispel both of these 
objections, I suggest a hybrid ontology according to which substances are to be conceived as 
on Loux’s ontology (i.e. composites of matter and substantial universal); but accidental 
universals are to be related to their substances as in Lowe’s ontology (see Fig. 5).   
 According to the hybrid ontology, a portion of matter instantiates a substantial 
universal, which together constitute a substance.  The substance, in turn, is characterized by 
particular instantiations of accidental universals, but these are not constituents (so there are 
no coincidentals composed of substances and accidental properties on this ontology).  On this 
view, substances ontologically depend upon their constituents of matter and substantial 
universals (in the way explained in Section 1.1), contrary to Lowe’s conception of substance.  
The hybrid ontology, however, mirrors Lowe’s in all other respects and includes the same 
formal relationships of characterization and exemplification.  This ontology offers a 
thoroughgoing analysis of what it is to be a substance, with only very minimally reductive 
consequences; and it offers a coherent and empirically satisfactory account of the immanence 
of accidental universals.  
3.2 The hybrid ontology as a model for thisness 
Although the hybrid substance ontology is able to deal effectively with what I take to be the 
weaknesses of its predecessors, how does it fare as a model for thisness?  Were we to develop 
the model along the same lines as in previous sections, it would look very much like the 
model developed from Lowe’s ontology (Fig. 4), with the exception that the substantial 
particular which is individuated by its thisness mode would itself be composed of matter and 
                                                          
16
 The extent to which one takes this as an objection will, of course, depend upon whether one takes a 
thoroughgoing analysis of substance to be a desirable thing.  My point has simply been that if we can analyze 
substance further without completely reducing it away, then we should do so.   
24 
 
substantial universal.  Would this exception make for a material difference between Lowe’s 
model and the hybrid model?  In fact, I believe it would.  Recall during the assessment of 
Loux’s ontology as a model for thisness (Section 1.2), we were left wondering what need 
have we for thisness if the constituent matter of a substance x can play the role of 
individuation for x.  As a matter of fact, I think that matter probably can play this role.  I 
argue in Diekemper (2009) that the Max Black style, spatial dispersion arguments which are 
commonly used to argue against the thesis that matter and spatial position can individuate 
across possible worlds are not successful in that endeavour.  However, I also argue that the 
analogous temporal dispersion arguments, which are meant to show that temporal position 
cannot individuate, are successful.  These conclusions imply that material substances do not, 
and events do, have thisness.  So although I think some entities have thisness (such as 
events), material substances in all likelihood do not.  Why, then, did I choose material 
substance ontologies as potential models for thisness, if I do not believe that material 
substances have thisness?  It is because substance ontologies are, quite rightly, the most 
developed of all ontologies, and because they are capable of serving as models of 
instantiation for a variety of ontological kinds.   
 So although the hybrid ontology, as a model for thisness, makes thisness redundant in 
the case of material substances, this is perfectly consistent with my own views on thisness.  I 
conclude that although the hybrid ontology, as a substance ontology in its own right, is to be 
preferred among the other ontologies considered, it is not suitable as a model for thisness.  
Given that it is superfluous to postulate the instantiation of thisness by any entity which has 
matter as an essential constituent, a model for thisness should not have matter as an essential 
aspect of the model. 
4.0 An ontology for thisness 
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I therefore endorse the model developed in Section 2.2 (Fig. 4) as the best model for an 
ontology of thisness, with the understanding that ‘Substantial particulars’ in that model 
should be replaced with the general term ‘Individuals.’  Further, since I take it that events, at 
least, are not essentially spatial or material entities and do require thisness for their 
individuation, I would like to make some programmatic remarks about how the ontology in 
Fig. 4 lends itself to describing the instantiation of thisness in these entities.   
 According to this ontological framework, a thisness property F is exemplified by an 
individual x in virtue of having a particular instantiation (its mode) F* which individuates x.  
F comes into existence at the same time that F* begins to individuate x (i.e. when x begins to 
exist).  Upon x’s demise F* also ceases to exist, but F continues to exist.  Now suppose that x 
is an event (call it e): e comes into existence when it occurs at time t (I assume here the 
temporal ontology implied by Adams’s TTT), as does its thisness mode F* which rigidly, 
ontologically depends upon it.  e’s thisness property F also comes into existence at t, but 
since its ontological dependence upon F* is non-rigid, it (i.e. F) will continue to exist even 
after e is no longer occurring.  So when e ceases to occur at some time later than t, F* ceases 
to exist, but F does not.  And now we can see that this framework is particularly apt in the 
case of a temporal ontology according to which the past exists and the future does not, since 
the continued existence of e’s thisness property F provides a ground for the existence of e, 
even though e is no longer occurring.
17
   
 What should we make of F*’s relationship to e?  I began to address this question in 
Section 2.2 (above), but I would like to say something more about it in the context of an 
ontology of thisness for events.  There I claimed that a thisness mode F* individuates its 
individual x by being a particularized, spatiotemporal instance of x’s principle of 
                                                          
17
 I defend this conception of past existence in Diekemper (manuscript). 
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individuation.  But what is this particularized principle other than the particularized property 
of being identical to x?  And what, in turn, is this, other than simply x itself?  The thought is 
that a particularized, spatiotemporal instance of being identical to x is none other than x!  
This characterization of the thisness mode, as simply being the individual that it individuates, 
would have been redundant in the case of material substances (given a constituent ontology 
of material substances), but in the case of events it is far more plausible, given that there are 
extant theories of events which take events to be instantiations of tropes.
18
   
 In order to make this suggestion work—the suggestion that the thisness mode of an 
event just is the event—one would have to develop a theory of events such that the theory 
cohered with the ontology of thisness suggested here.
19
  I take it that this is a general point 
about the role of the ontology of thisness: although it presents a plausible framework for the 
instantiation of thisness in any kind of individual, it cannot stand alone, but must be applied 
in conjunction with an appropriate ontology for the kind of individual in question.  This was 
the lesson from the case of material substances, since the ontology of substances that I ended 
up endorsing was not one which provided a good fit with the ontology of thisness.  Suppose 
that persons are not conceived of as essentially material entities, and suppose that they too 
require thisness for their individuation; then an application of the ontology of thisness to 
persons would also have to be carried out in conjunction with a worked out theory of persons.  
Clearly, however, this is not the place to begin working out theories of events or persons.  
                                                          
18
 For two such theories see Bennett (1988) and Cleland (1991). 
19
 In Section 2.1 (above) I took issue with Lowe’s characterization of a substance as simply being an instance of 
a substantial universal, claiming that it did not provide a thoroughgoing analysis of substance.  Could the same 
objection be made to my suggestion that an event is simply a thisness mode?  Again, this would depend on 
one’s theory of events, but given the primitive, non-qualitative character of thisness, I do not think the two 
claims are of a piece. 
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What I have tried to develop here is a general framework for the relationship between an 
individual and its thisness.  Inasmuch as the ontology in Fig. 4 grounds both the individuating 
role of thisness and its temporal structure (assuming Adams’s TTT), it provides the 
framework required. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, I have argued first, that a hybrid Aristotelian ontology according to which 
substances are to be conceived as composites of matter and substantial universal, but 
accidental universals are to be related to their substances via a two step exemplification 
structure (as in Fig. 5), is to be the preferred substance ontology; and second, that the 
preferred ontology for thisness is one according to which an abstract, thisness property is 
exemplified by an individual x in virtue of having a particular instantiation (its mode) which 




 Fig. 1: Loux’s Aristotelian constituent ontology:
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Fig. 3: Lowe’s Aristotelian four-category ontology (‘the ontological square’, see Lowe 2006: 
93 and 111): 
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Fig. 4: Thisness model derived from Lowe’s ontology: 
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Fig. 5: Hybrid Aristotelian ontology: 
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